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Abstract
The short run effects of financial constraints (FCs) on the expected growth rate of firms
and their long-term implications on the evolution of the firm size distribution have been recently
investigated by several scholars. In this paper we extend the analysis to a wider and largely unex-
plored range of possible FCs effects, including the autoregressive and heteroskedastic structure
of the firm growth process and the degree of asymmetry in the distribution of growth shocks. We
measure FCs with an official credit rating index which directly captures the borrowers’ opinion
on a firm’s financial soundness and, consequently, the availability and cost of external resources.
Our investigations reveal that FCs operate through several channels. In the short term, FCs
reduce the average firm growth rate, induce anti-correlation in growth shocks and reduce the
dependence of growth rates volatility on size. Financing constraints also operate through asym-
metric threshold effects, both preventing potentially fast growing firms from enjoying attractive
growth opportunities, and further deteriorating the growth prospects of already slow growing
firms. The sub-diffusive nature of the growth process of constrained firms is compatible with the
distinctive properties of their size distribution.
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1 Introduction
Firms’ ability to access external financial resources represents a factor influencing several dimen-
sions of firm dynamics, as the links between financial and operational activities of firms involve
many types of decisions, pertaining, for instance, investment strategies, the ability to enter or sur-
vive in a market, job creation and destruction, innovative activity, and internationalization patterns.
Within the vast body of literature focusing on the relationships between finance and firms’ dy-
namics, a well developed tradition of empirical studies has sought to identify the effect of financing
problems on the size-growth trajectories of firms (for reviews, see Whited, 2006; Fagiolo and Luzzi,
2006; Oliveira and Fortunato, 2006). A first major problem in this identification rests in the intrinsi-
cally difficult task of measuring financial constraints (FCs). In fact, FCs are not directly observable,
as it is not possible to know whether banks or other financial institutions refuse a loan or if par-
ticularly high interest rates are charged to a given firm. To overcome this difficulty, researchers
have proposed different approaches seeking to classify firms into financially constrained and uncon-
strained categories. The debate about which particular measure to use, originating in the literature
on financing constraints to firms’ investment (Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 2000), is
still open. A first strategy is to sort firms into constrained or unconstrained groups according to
their relative ranking in the distribution of some variable which is supposed to be related with the
need, availability and cost of external finance. A few examples include age, size, cash flow, leverage,
availability of collateral, interest coverage, payout ratios, cash flow sensitivity of cash. Alternatively,
a multivariate approach can be followed, through the construction of index measures of FCs which
summarize several aspects of firm financial structure into a single indicator. This approach allows
to capture different degrees of FCs, avoiding a simple binary categorization(Kaplan and Zingales,
1997; Whited and Wu, 2006; Musso and Schiavo, 2008). In the same spirit, several classifications
have been proposed which rely on some kind of credit rating measure (of specific bonds or commer-
cial papers, or of the overall debt position of a firm). These measures have the advantage to judge
access to credit on the basis of financial markets’ evaluation of the credit quality of a firm (Whited,
1992; Almeida et al., 2004). All of these approaches measure FCs by resorting to “hard” data, i.e.
exploiting information available through business registers. The most common alternative consists
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of classifications based on survey data. Surveys typically involve managers or entrepreneurs, who
are asked to make a self-assessment of whether firms have been rationed or not, whether the cost
and the amount of granted loans were in line with their expectations and needs, and, more generally,
about the difficulties they have faced in accessing financing from banks or other institutions (Winker,
1999; Angelini and Generale, 2008; Campello et al., 2009).
None of the proposed approaches are without their pitfalls, and there is no clear consensus on
how different ways of measuring FCs can impact the obtained results. On the one hand, both uni-
variate or multivariate proxies derived from business registers inevitably give an indirect measure of
FCs, as they implicitly assume that the poor records of firms with respect to the chosen variables get
translated into a bank’s unwillingness to grant credit. This assumption appears particularly problem-
atic when the analysis is exclusively based on totally exogenous variables, like age, or structural and
extremely persistent variables, like availability of collateral. On the other hand survey based mea-
sures, which are seemingly closer to answering the question as to whether a firm has actually been
constrained or not, are well known to suffer from misreporting and sample selection bias, whose ef-
fect is difficult to quantify. Moreover, by collecting the opinion of the credit seeker about their own
financing conditions, survey data look at the demand side of credit relations. Rather, given the strong
informational asymmetries characterizing capital markets, it is the opinion of the credit supplier on
the credit seeker that plays the crucial role in determining credit conditions.
Once a measure of FCs has been selected for the analysis, the standard approach in the literature
has been to check the significance of this measure in a standard firm growth regression, either by
directly including the chosen FCs proxy among the regressors, or by modeling FCs as dummy vari-
ables indicating that a firm belongs to some specific FCs category. The generally accepted finding
is that FCs negatively affect firm growth, and that this effect is stronger for younger and smaller
firms (see Angelini and Generale, 2008). These findings are in line with the recent theoretical litera-
ture on financing and growth models Cooley and Quadrini (2001); Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006),
largely based on the models of industrial dynamics in Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992).
A major limitation of these studies is however that the kind of specifications employed can only
identify location-shift effects in the conditional distribution of growth rates. The shift is accounted
for by a statistically significant correlation of average growth rates with the FC proxy, or by observed
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deviations in expected growth rates between the classes of constrained and unconstrained firms. Al-
though there is a general agreement that FCs downplay growth prospects of firms, there is no clear
reason why this reduction should exclusively translate into a negative shift of the average growth
rate. In fact, there are various pieces of evidence that make the shift hypothesis rather simplistic.
Firstly, the evidence that FCs problems affect several dimensions of firms’ behavior and strategies,
such as investment/divestment in fixed capital (Fazzari et al., 1988; Devereux and Schiantarelli,
1990; Bond et al., 2003) and in working capital (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993), cash management
policies (Campello et al., 2009), inventory demand (Kashyap et al., 1994), or R&D and innovation
strategies (Hall, 2002; Brown et al., 2009), clearly suggests that the role played by FCs is likely to
be complex and structured. Secondly, recent qualitative evidence on firms’ reactions to the current
financial crisis (see Campello et al., 2009) suggests that firms undertake heterogeneous responses to
FC problems: there are firms that tend to abandon some investment projects, despite their potential,
while other firms, especially those which are already experiencing poor growth dynamics, tend to
display a much higher propensity to sell off productive assets as a way to generate funds. Heteroge-
neous responses can induce different effects in different quantiles of the (conditional) growth rates
distribution.
To account for the many possible channels through which FCs can affect firm growth, in this
paper we extend the usual autoregressive growth model. We introduce a parametric specification
of the heteroskedasticity of growth rates and we allow for asymmetries in growth shocks across
firms subject to different strength of FCs. The first extension is motivated by the robust empirical
observation that smaller firms experience more volatile growth patterns (among others, see Hymer
and Pashigian, 1962; Amaral et al., 1997; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2005). Such heteroskedasticity is
typically viewed as a factor to wash away in obtaining consistent estimates (Hall, 1987; Evans,
1987; Dunne et al., 1988). Conversely, we consider it as part of the phenomenon under study,
and we want to understand if FCs have a role in explaining the relationship between volatility of
growth and size. Our second extension, that is the assessment of possible asymmetries, is pursued
by investigating the extent to which FCs affect the overall shape of growth rates distribution, a topic
so far largely neglected (see Fagiolo and Luzzi, 2006, for the only exception we are aware of ). Our
specification enables us to reconcile the effects of FCs on firm growth dynamics with the observed
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differences in the firm size distribution (FSD) of constrained and non-constrained firms. Exploring
such differences is of recent interest and the evidence is both scant and controversial. Cabral and
Mata (2003) found that the evolution of the FSD is determined by firms ceasing to be financially
constrained, while Fagiolo and Luzzi (2006) and Angelini and Generale (2008) concluded that FCs
are not the main determinant of FSD evolution. At least part of the explanation for such seemingly
contrasting evidence may come from the different proxies of FCs employed in these studies. Indeed,
Cabral and Mata (2003) measure FCs with age, assuming that younger firms are more constrained,
while Fagiolo and Luzzi (2006) and Angelini and Generale (2008) adopt reported cash flow and
survey-based measure of FCs, respectively.
We perform our analysis using a measure of FCs based on an official credit rating. Credit ratings,
by their very definition, are similar to the multivariate indicators of FCs derived from hard data.
Similarly to those measures, they do not suffer from the biases inherently affecting survey measures
and offer the opportunity to account for different degrees of exposure to FCs. The official source, the
high reliability and the widespread use of the specific rating adopted in our study strongly suggest
that it is used as an actual benchmark for the lending decisions of banks and financial institutions.
In this respect, our rating does not only summarize a wide range of potential sources of financial
problems. It also captures the actual expectations of credit suppliers on the ability of firms to meet
obligations, thus getting closer to measuring whether or not credit is granted to a particular firm.
Using a large panel of Italian manufacturing firms, our analysis reveals that FCs do affect the
process of firm growth through multiple channels. In the short term, FCs reduce the average firm
growth rate, induce anti-correlation in growth shocks and reduce the strength of the dependence
of volatility of growth rates on size. In addition, we also find asymmetric effect on growth rates
distribution. On the one hand, FCs prevent attractive growth opportunities from being seized by
constrained but yet potentially fast growing firms. This effect is particularly strong for younger
firms. At the same time, and especially among older firms, FCs tend to be associated with a further
depression in the growth prospects of already slow-growing firms. These effects are consistent with
the distinctive features of the size distribution of more severely constrained firms obtained through
a snapshot analysis on cross-sectional data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, introduces our FC measure and
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provides a first descriptive account of the relevance of the FC phenomenon. Section 3 analyzes the
role of FCs in affecting the age profile of the FSD. In Section 4 we develop our baseline framework
and derive the hypotheses guiding our empirical investigations and the interpretation of results. Sec-
tion 5 presents the main results of our analysis of FC effects on the patterns of firm growth, also
investigating the effects of FCs on the firm growth rates distribution. Section 6 tests the robustness
of the findings with respect to a set of potentially relevant determinants of size-growth dynamics and
firms’ financing decisions. In Section 7 we summarize our findings and conclude.
2 Financing constraints: definition and basic facts
We employ a large database of Italian firms maintained by the Italian Company Account Data Service
(Centrale dei Bilanci, CeBi). CeBi was founded as a joint agency of the Bank of Italy and the Italian
Banking Association in the early 1980s to assist in supervising risk exposure of the Italian banking
system. Today CeBi is a private company owned by major Italian banks, which continue to exploit
its services in gathering and sharing information about firms. The long term institutional role of
CeBi ensures high levels of data reliability, substantially limiting measurement errors. The dataset is
of a business register type, collecting annual reports for virtually all limited liability firms. The data
available for the present study follow approximately 200, 000 firms active in manufacturing over the
period 1999-2003. Considering this sector, our data account for about 45% of total employment and
about 65% of aggregate value added over the years of observation.1 Moreover, the data replicate
pretty well the distributional profile of firm size in the overall population of Italian manufacturing.2
For each firm, we were able to access a subset of the original list of variables included in the annual
reports. We derive the Age of the firm from its foundation year, and we proxy firm size through real
Total Sales. The decision to prefer Total Sales over Number of Employees as a measure of size is
because in our data, consistently with the Italian accounting system, employment figures are reported
1These shares are computed with respect to National Accounts data by sector of activity, as reported by Eurostat.
Pistaferri et al. (2010) report similar figures. They also report that the CeBi database contains approximately the 7% of
all Italian manufacturing firms.
2For 2003, the annual report of the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT, 2005) provides the following distribution: 82%
of firms has less then 10 employees; 15% has 10-to-49 employees; 2% has 50-to-249 employees, and 1% has more than
250 employees. In our data there is a very mild overrepresentation of medium-larger firms: 78% of firms has less then
10 employees; 13% is in the 10-249 size class; 8% has 50-to-249 employees and 1% has more than 250 employees.
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in the notes accompanying financial statements, and are therefore likely to be affected by less reliable
updates. For small firms especially, a mistake of even few units of personnel in employment reports
may produce a huge error in the measurement of employment growth rates.3
As a measure of FCs we adopt the credit rating index that CeBi produces for all the firms included
in the dataset. In fact, credit ratings account for the “opinion [of credit suppliers] on the future
obligor’s capacity to meet its financial obligations”(Crouhy et al., 2001). CeBi ratings enjoy several
qualities identified as desirable for a measure of financial constraints (Cleary, 1999; Lamont et al.,
2001). First, they result from a multivariate score, thus summarizing a wide range of dimensions of
firm performance. Second, they are updated in every year, thus allowing for the identification of time
effects. Third, they do not force the researcher to work with a binary categorization of constrained
versus non-constrained firms. Indeed, the graduation of scores attributed by credit ratings to the
different firms allow to distinguish among different degrees of difficulty in accessing external funds.
These features are common to CeBi ratings and ratings issued by international agencies like Moody’s
or Standard & Poor’s. However, CeBi ratings enjoy three specific advantages. First, they give an
assessment of the overall quality of a firm, rather than imply a judgment about the quality of a
single liability of a company. Second, they are available for all the firms included in the dataset,
while credit files from international rating institutions bias the scope of analysis towards a much less
representative sub-sample of firms. Third, the CeBi index is perceived as an official rating, due to
the tight link established between CeBi and major Italian banks. This justifies the heavy reliance of
banks on CeBi ratings: it is generally true that a firm with very poor rating is not likely to receive
credit.4
The CeBi index is a score ranking firms in 9 categories of creditworthiness: 1-high reliability,
2-reliability, 3-ample solvency, 4-solvency, 5-vulnerability, 6-high vulnerability, 7-risk, 8-high risk,
and 9-extremely high risk. The ranking is purely ordinal. We define three classes of firms subject
to different degrees of financial constraints: Non Financially Constrained (NFC), Mildly Financially
Constrained (MFC) and Highly Financially Constrained (HFC), corresponding respectively to firms
rated from 1 to 4, 5 to 7, and 8 to 9. Since the CeBi index is updated at the end of each year, it is the
3Nominal sales are deflated via 3-digit sectoral production price indexes made available by the Italian Statistical
office, base year 2000. A basic cleaning procedure to remove a few outlying observations is applied (see the appendix
for details). Reported results refer to 2000-2003 as one year is obviously lost in the computation of growth rates.
4See also Pistaferri et al. (2010) for a similar use of CeBi ratings as a proxy of firms’ access to credit market.
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Table 1: FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS BY AGE CLASSES
Whole Sample Non Financially Constrained Mildly Financially Constrained Highly Financially constrained
Number of firms
(percentage of
age class)
Number of firms
(percentage of
age class)
Number of firms
(percentage of
age class)Firm’s age(years) Number of firms
Size: mean
(median)
Size: mean
(median)
Size: mean
(median)
Size: mean
(median)
0-4 38,020 1.795 10,356 1.804 20,408 1.970 7,256 1.293
(0.606) (27.2) (0.525) (53.7) (0.719) (19.1) (0.449)
5-10 52,150 3.369 18,269 4.115 27,862 3.248 6,019 1.666
(0.860) (35.0) (0.844) (53.4) (0.995) (11.5) (0.439)
11-20 62,977 7.093 29,130 8.210 29,408 6.400 4,439 4.354
(1.522) (55.9) (1.606) (46.7) (1.663) (7.0) (0.525)
21-30 35,579 10.139 18,966 11.147 15,080 9.544 1,533 3.520
(2.674) (53.3) (2.719) (42.4) (2.921) (4.3) (0.696)
31-∞ 20,645 25.917 11,374 26.600 8,213 22.157 1,058 47.760
(4.516) (55.1) (4.919) (39.8) (4.764) (5.1) (1.345)
Total 209,371 7.577 88,095 9.614 100,971 6.386 20,305 4.662
(1.301) (42.1) (1.548) (48.2) (1.371) (9.7) (0.494)
Size as real sales, millions of euro.
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rating in t− 1 that is relevant for credit suppliers when they have to decide whether to provide credit
in year t. Therefore, the assignment to the three classes is based on one-period lagged values of the
ratings. Together, this choice also reduces the simultaneity issue potentially arising in regression
analysis.5
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics. According to our definition financing problems appear to
represent a significant phenomenon: about 10% of the whole sample is affected by severe difficulties
in raising external resources (i.e. are HFC firms), while almost half of our sample (48%, cfr. the
MFC class) faces less severe, but still significant problems. This is in partial contrast with a result
reported in Angelini and Generale (2008) on a smaller Italian dataset. Secondly, FCs are a pervasive
phenomenon, affecting firms of different sizes and ages: more than 5% of old firms are in the HFC
class, and the mean size of HFC firms is comparable with the mean size of the other two classes.6
However, confirming a robust finding in the literature, FCs seem more relevant among young and
small firms: 20% of young firms are HFC, against a 5% of HFC firms found in the group of older
firms and, moreover, the median size of HFC firms is, in all age classes, almost one third smaller as
compared to the other FC classes.
3 Financing constraints and age profile of the FSD
Figure 1 reports kernel estimates of the empirical density of real sales by age.7 Results broadly
confirm the basic stylized facts observed in previous studies, where size is proxied with employment:
the FSD is right-skewed and both the mode and the width of the distribution increase with age. This
visual impression is confirmed by a Fligner-Policello test for stochastic dominance. The FSD of
older firms dominates those of younger firms, meaning that a firm randomly drawn from the group
5In order to check the sensitivity of our results to the adopted classification, we also considered two alternative
assignment procedures. In the first procedure, firms were assigned to FC classes on the basis of the worst rating displayed
over the sample period. In the second procedure, we restricted the analysis to firms that did never change their financial
status over the whole time window (i.e., based on their ratings in the different years, they always fell in the same FC
class). Our main conclusions were not affected by the choice of the assignment procedure, though. All the results are
available upon request.
6The very high mean found within HFC old firms, 47.760, is explained by the presence of quite large firm (actually
the largest in the dataset) which is old and HFC over the sample period. The mean size falls to 18,415 if we exclude this
firm from the sample.
7Here as well as throughout the work, estimates of densities are obtained using the Epanenchnikov kernel with the
bandwidth set using the simple heuristic described in Silverman (1986).
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Figure 1: FSD and Age. Pooled data over 2000-2003.
of older firms is, with a probability significantly higher than 50%, bigger than a firm randomly
extracted from the group of younger firms.8
However, from the graphical analysis alone it is difficult to provide a precise statement on the
validity of a second common piece of evidence reported in the literature, i.e. that the degree of FSD
skewness diminishes with age. Available studies tend to agree on this point, although Angelini and
Generale (2008) report that the FSD appears to be more symmetric when using sales, instead of num-
ber of employees. To provide a quantitative assessment of this issue, we consider the Asymmetric
Exponential Power (AEP) distribution. This family copes with asymmetries and leptokurtosis, at the
same time allowing for a continuous variation from non-normality to normality. The AEP density
fAEP(x;p) =
1
C
e
−
„
1
bl
˛˛˛
x−m
al
˛˛˛bl
θ(m−x)+ 1
br
|x−mar |
br
θ(x−m)
«
, (1)
where p = (bl, br, al, ar, m), θ(x) is the Heaviside theta function and C = alA0(bl)+ arA0(br) with
Ak(x) = x
k+1
x
−1 Γ
(
k+1
x
)
, is characterized by 5 parameters. Two positive shape parameters, br and
bl, describe the tail behavior in the upper and lower tail, respectively. Two positive scale parameters,
8This test is presented in Fligner and Policello (1981) and can be interpreted as a test of stochastic dominance in the
case of asymmetric samples. A pair-wise comparison of the distribution in Figure 1 confirms significant differences,
with negligible p-scores (less than 10−6 in all cases).
11
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 1000000
d
en
si
ty
ln real total sales
FIRM SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF NFC FIRMS
YOUNG
OLD
AEP DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS
Young Firms
bl= 1.464(0.057)       br= 1.425(0.052) 
al= 1.228(0.038)       ar= 1.301(0.038) 
Old Firms
bl= 0.926(0.026)       br= 2.297(0.070) 
al= 1.336(0.025)       ar= 2.258(0.044) 
(a) Age < 5 years (10,093 obs)
(b) Age > 30 years (11,374 obs)
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 1000000
d
en
si
ty
ln real total sales
FIRM SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF MFC FIRMS
YOUNG
OLD
AEP DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS
Young Firms
bl= 1.254(0.034)       br= 1.722(0.044) 
al= 1.009(0.022)       ar= 1.395(0.028) 
Old Firms
bl= 1.026(0.039)       br= 2.205(0.080) 
al= 1.165(0.031)       ar= 2.131(0.053) 
(a) Age < 5 years (19,823)
(b) Age > 30 years (8,207 obs)
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 1000000
d
en
si
ty
ln real total sales
FIRM SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF HFC FIRMS
YOUNG
OLD
AEP DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS
Young Firms
bl= 1.284(0.054)       br= 1.568(0.074) 
al= 1.302(0.042)       ar= 1.274(0.048) 
Old Firms
bl= 0.904(0.065)       br= 0.901(0.070) 
al= 1.677(0.083)       ar= 1.389(0.074) 
(a) Age < 5 years (6,880)
(b) Age > 30 years (1,066 obs)
 6.5
 7
 7.5
 8
 8.5
 9
m
ed
ia
n
MEDIAN FIRM SIZE AND AEP RIGHT WIDTH PARAMETER ar BY AGE CLASS
NFC
MFC
HFC
 0.8
 1
 1.2
 1.4
 1.6
 1.8
 2
 2.2
<5 5-10 11-20 21-30 >30
ri
g
h
t 
w
id
th
 p
ar
am
et
er
 a
r
Age
Figure 2: FSD, Age and Financial Constraints. Pooled data over 2000-2003.
ar and al, are associated with the width of the distribution above and below the modal value, which
is captured through the location parameter m.
Maximum Likelihood estimates of the AEP parameters are reported in Figure 1 (corresponding
standard errors are always smaller than 0.05). They reveal two different patterns in the degree of
FSD skewness, arising respectively in the right- and left-hand side of the distribution. The left
tail becomes fatter as age increases (bl decreases while al is approximately stable) so that among
relatively smaller firms size differences are bigger among older firms. In the right-hand side of the
distribution, as we move from younger to older firms, there is a shift in probability mass from the
tail to the central part of the distribution (br increases with age) together with an overall increase in
the width of support (ar increasing with age).9
We then ask whether disaggregation into FC classes can help explaining the asymmetric effect
9Notice that the Extended Generalized Gamma distribution applied in Cabral and Mata (2003), which possesses only
one shape parameter, would not have allowed to independently account for the different behaviors observed in the two
tails.
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that age seems to exert on the properties of the FSD. Figure 2 reports kernel estimates of the FSD
for firms in the different FC classes, directly comparing young (less than 5 years) and old (more than
30 years) firms in each class.10. Since we cannot follow cohorts of firms in our data, a comparison
across firms of different age is the only way to have a clue on the relationship between size, age
and financial constraints. The results (top left and right, and bottom left panels) suggest that the
size-age profile of NFC and MFC firms share similar distributional properties, while the FSD of
HFC firms display distinctive features. The difference essentially concerns the intensity of the effect
that age exerts on the location and variance of the size distribution. When comparing young and
old firms within each class, we observe that the increase in both location and variance induced by
firm aging is much milder among HFC firms than in the other two classes. This is confirmed by the
results in the bottom-right plot. Here we proxy location and width of the FSD, respectively, with the
median size and the estimates of the right width AEP parameter, ar, and then report how these two
indicators vary by age and FC class. Both measures are very similar across all the FC classes when
we consider young firms. Then, as age increases, it is possible to identify two diverging trends, one
common to NFC and MFC firms, and a second specific to the group of HFC firms. The median size
of NFC and MFC firms increases more than tenfold from young to old firms, while the median size
of HFC firms increases only by a factor of 5. Similarly, the estimates of ar reveal that FSD dispersion
increases significantly with age for NFC and MFC firms, while the increase is much more modest
for HFC firms. The existence of such diverging patterns is also supported by the estimates of br, the
parameter describing the right tail behavior. Indeed from very similar values for young firms (∼1.4,
∼1.7 and ∼1.6 for the NFC, MFC and HFC classes respectively), the estimated coefficients diverge
when old firms are considered: old NFC and old MFC firms display values of br close to 2, and
hence approximately consistent with a Gaussian distribution, while for old HFC firms the estimated
br drops from 1.6 to 0.9.
In summary, the dependence of the aggregate FSD on firms’ age found in Figure 1 results from
a mixture of the FSD of financially constrained firms, which are responsible for the fat left tail ob-
served in any age class, and of the FSD of non-constrained firms, which accounts for the tendency
toward a Gaussian behavior observed in the right tail of older firms. While the distribution of young
10Other age classes are not reported for the sake of clarity.
13
firms is similar across different FC classes, clear-cut differences appear when older firms are con-
sidered. This fact suggests a certain degree of persistence in FC classes.11 Indeed if the probability
of a firm to belong to a FC class at a given age were independent of its past growth process, the FC
decomposition of the FSD would not reveal stronger differences among the older firms than among
the younger ones. Moreover, the effect exerted by financial conditions seems to extend beyond a
simple shift in the mean, as testified by the age profile of the estimated parameters. In the next
section we propose a framework designed to capture the different effects plausibly at the basis of
the interaction between age, financial constraints and firm growth, which has been revealed by the
snapshot analysis of the size distribution.
4 Analytical Framework
We start from the phenomenological model of industrial dynamics based on the classical work by
Gibrat (1931). Let st be the logarithm of firm size at time t. The simple integrated process
st = st−1 + ǫt (2)
with iid distributed shocks ǫt, often referred to as the “Law of Proportionate Effect”, has been shown
to yield a good first order description of the observed dynamics of firm size (see among others
Mansfield, 1962; Kumar, 1985; Hall, 1987). In order to account for the various effects of FCs on
firm growth dynamics we consider a generalized version of the model, at the same time allowing for
FC-class specific values in the relevant coefficients
st − st−1 = cF C + λF C st−1 + σF C (st−1)ǫF C,t , (3)
where λ captures an autoregressive component in the (log) levels of firm size, σ is a function describ-
ing the heteroskedastic structure of the process and ǫ are assumed to be independent of size. The
11Due to the short time window of our database we cannot directly test the persistence in firm financial conditions
over long span of times. The analysis of transition matrix between FC classes reveals a significant persistence. The
average 1-year probability to remain in the same class is 83.72% for NFC firms, 77.47% for MFC firms, and 55.90% for
HFC firms.
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Figure 3: Evolution of the FSD for two different values of the autoregressive coefficient λ in equa-
tion (3). In the simulations we consider 15, 000 firms and we set Mǫ = 0.25 and Vǫ = 0.5.
inclusion of an AR(1) structure accounts for the fact that smaller firms are often reported to grow
faster (see Lotti et al., 2003, for an in-depth review of the empirical literature).12 The function σ
introduces a dependence of the standard deviation of growth shocks on size, which has been reported
in a large number of empirical studies. The common finding is that volatility is higher for smaller
firms, and that the relationship displays an exponential decrease (see the discussion and references
in Bottazzi and Secchi, 2005).
By allowing for FC class specific coefficients, the model in equation (3) allows FCs to produce
an effect through four different channels: on the drift term c, on the autoregressive term λ, on the
heteroskedasticity term σ(st−1) and on the properties of the distribution of growth shocks ǫ. Let us
outline the economic interpretation of these channels, and the predictions that can be made.
The coefficient λ is related to the long-term dynamics of the evolution of size. Too see how let
us neglect, for the sake of simplicity, the FC subscript and the heteroskedasticity correction, and
let the mean and variance of the size distribution at time t be Mst and Vst , respectively. Under the
12The AR(1) specification can be replaced with a more general linear model. For the present discussion the 1-lag
structure is sufficient, as we checked that the inclusion of further lags does not generate significant modifications in the
estimates of λ.
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hypothesis of a constant λ, their evolution from t = 0 to t = T is given by
MsT = (1 + λ)
T Ms0 +
(1 + λ)T − 1
λ
Mǫ , VsT = (1 + λ)
2T Vs0 +
(1 + λ)2T − 1
(1 + λ)2 − 1
Vǫ
where Mǫ and Vǫ are the mean and variance of the shocks ǫ.13 When λ = 0, as in the benchmark
Gibrat’s model, we have a diffusion process: the time evolution of sT follows a unit root process
(discrete Brownian motion) asymptotically diverging to a log-normal FSD with indefinitely increas-
ing variance and zero mean. Conversely, when λ < 0 the process is sub-diffusive and the FSD
converges in probability to a stationary distribution with finite variance Vǫ/(1− (1+λ)2). The anal-
ysis in Section 3 suggests that λ < 0 may be the case for more severely constrained firms. Figure 3
shows that even small differences in the value of λ, can quickly produce significantly different FSD
shapes.
Next, differences in c across FC classes provide information on the effect of FCs on the central
tendency of the distributions, i.e. on the aforementioned location-shift effects across constrained or
non-constrained firms. This is the kind of effect captured by the standard growth regression models
traditionally proposed in the literature. Under the plausible conjecture that FCs reduce the set or the
amount of growth opportunities seizable by constrained firms, then the prediction of the model is
that the group of most severely constrained firms has the lowest estimated c.
Furthermore, differences in σ across FC classes captures an heteroskedasticity effect due to FCs,
revealing that FCs also produce changes in the way the variability of growth rates depends on size.
The often found reduction of growth rate volatility with size has been interpreted as a portfolio
effect (Bottazzi and Secchi, 2005): since larger firms are typically more diversified than small firms
(in terms of products, lines of business, plants,. . . ) they can balance negative and positive shocks
hitting their single branches (at least if the various activities are weakly correlated). According
to this interpretation, we can conjecture that FCs, by reducing the range of attainable new growth
opportunities, also reduce the diversification advantage of bigger firms. We therefore expect to
observe weaker heteroskedasticity effects within the group of the most severely constrained firms.
Finally, concerning the possible effects of FC on the empirical distribution of growth shocks,
13See the Appendix for a formal derivation.
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Figure 4: Possible effects of financing constraints on the growth rates distribution.
we can sketch some predictions based on the qualitative findings in Campello et al. (2009). In Fig-
ure 4 the solid line corresponds to a Laplace distribution of growth shocks (a “tent” on a log-scale)
which represents the benchmark for non-constrained firms. The Laplace distribution has been cho-
sen because invariably observed in empirical data across different countries and at different levels
of sectoral aggregation (cfr. Stanley et al., 1996; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2006).14 The dashed line de-
scribes the possible distributional effects that could plausibly emerge under the influence of binding
FCs. One effect is a “pinioning the wings” effect: FCs prevent firms that face potentially good
growth opportunities from actually seizing some of them (beyond a certain ’hit FC’ threshold), thus
forcing these firms to abandon or postpone some profitable investment projects. Although positive
growth is still attainable in the presence of FCs, these firms would have enjoyed much higher growth
records, if not hit by FCs. Such an effect would imply a slimming down of the right tail of the growth
shocks distribution (cfr. ’case a’ in Figure 4). Another possibility is that FC are responsible for a
“loss reinforcing” effect. This predicts that firms who are already facing losses in market shares
will experience a further deterioration in their poor growth rates in the presence of credit constraints
problems, for example because they are forced to sell productive assets and divest activities, thus
ultimately facing a reduction in revenues. This effect would be reflected in a shift of mass from the
left-hand part of the density towards the bottom extreme, generating a fatter left tail (cfr. ’case b’ in
14A first attempt to explain the emergence of this stylized fact, based on the idea of dynamic increasing returns, is
presented in Bottazzi and Secchi (2006).
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Figure 5: Empirical relation between the standard deviation of growth and firm size, by FC classes.
Figure 4).
5 Main results
A preliminary step in estimating equation (3) involves modeling heteroskedasticity. We characterize
σ
F C
(st−1) starting from the data. We consider the standard definition of growth rates in terms of
log-differences of size
gi,t = si,t − si,t−1 , (4)
and then, for each FC class, we plot the standard deviation of g computed within different bins
(quantiles) of the log-size distribution against the average log-size of the bin. Figure 5 reports results
obtained with 35 size bins. The whole procedure is very robust in terms of choice of the number
of bins. Scatter plots of the data tend to agree with previous studies, finding that the relationship
displays an exponential decrease. This is confirmed, for all FC classes, by the Non-Linear Least
Squares estimates reported in the graphs. It is also worth noticing that the relationship does not
depend on age. In fact, within each FC class, we do not observe any statistically significant difference
in the estimated relation when considering young versus old firms.15
15Results available upon request.
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Taking this evidence into account, we insert an explicit exponential heteroskedasticity term
σ
F C
(st−1) = exp(γF C · st−1) in our baseline model to obtain
st − st−1 = cF C + λF C st−1 + exp(γF C · st−1)ǫFC,t . (5)
A further important modeling issue concerns an appropriate treatment of the distribution of residu-
als. As mentioned, previous studies have documented that the distribution of growth shocks, once
heteroskedasticity has been properly modeled, is well approximated by a Laplace distribution. A
first choice would therefore be to allow for Laplacian residuals, via Least Absolute Deviation (LAD)
estimates. However, following the discussion in Section 4, we are also interested into possible
asymmetries in the distribution of growth shocks, and therefore, we perform Maximum Likelihood
estimates of equation (5) where we assume an Asymmetric Laplace distribution (ALAD) of the
residuals.16
Table 2 presents the results (cfr. Model 1) obtained in each FC class. A first notable finding
concerns the cross-class patterns in the autoregressive components. The estimated λ is not significant
for NFC firms, while it is significant but practically zero in the MFC class. This suggests that an
integrated process can represent a good approximation for the evolution of size in these two classes.
Conversely, the estimate of λ is significantly negative for HFC firms (about −0.02, roughly three
times bigger than in the other classes, in absolute value). This reveals that strong FCs give rise to
sizeable deviations from the Gibrat’s benchmark.17
The patterns in the constant terms are in line with expectations: average growth rate is positive
for non constrained firms, while statistically equal to zero in the other two classes. Confirming
intuition and standard results in the literature, FC problems reduce the average growth rate.
The estimates of the γ coefficients, confirming the graphical investigation reported in Figure 5,
reveal the clear-cut role of FCs in explaining the heteroskedasticity of growth shocks. For NFC and
MFC firms the estimated value is very close to −0.20 (which is strikingly similar to those reported
16This corresponds to assume that the error term follows an AEP distribution with bl = br = 1, and with al and ar
estimated from data.
17If one is ready to accept the persistence in financial conditions over relatively long spans of time that we have
indirectly inferred is Section 3, this result is sufficient to explain the lack of Gaussianization in the right tail of the FSD
observed among the HFC firms (cf. Figure 2 above).
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Table 2: REGRESSION ANALYSISa
Main Estimates Robustness checks
FC CLASS Model 1 Model 2A Model 2B
NFC
γ -0.200∗(0.001) -0.194∗(0.001) -0.193∗(0.0010)
constant 0.019∗(0.001) 0.022∗(0.001) 0.024∗(0.0024)
ln(Si,t−1) -0.0001(0.0003) -0.007∗(0.001) -0.008∗(0.0007)
ln(Agei,t) -0.025∗(0.001) -0.026∗(0.0008)
ln(Assetsbi,t−1) 0.011∗(0.001) 0.011∗(0.0005)
ln(GOMbi,t−1) 0.0001(0.0005) 0.0004(0.0005)
al, ar 0.201, 0.176 0.197, 0.171 0.198, 0.170
Number of observations 89344 85382 85382
MFC
γ -0.204∗(0.001) -0.195∗(0.001) -0.195∗(0.001)
constant -0.002(0.001) 0.0004(0.0003) -0.002(0.001)
ln(Si,t−1) -0.0063∗(0.0004) -0.017∗(0.001) -0.017∗(0.001)
ln(Agei,t) -0.041∗(0.001) -0.041∗(0.001)
ln(Assetsbi,t−1) 0.015∗(0.001) 0.014∗(0.001)
ln(GOMbi,t−1) 0.005∗(0.0004) 0.005∗(0.0004)
al, ar 0.231, 0.224 0.224, 0.216 0.223, 0.216
Number of observations 102321 97437 97437
HFC
γ -0.164∗(0.002) -0.152∗(0.0026) -0.151∗(0.003)
constant 0.006(0.003) 0.024∗(0.003) 0.016∗(0.004)
ln(Si,t−1) -0.019∗(0.002) -0.046∗(0.002) -0.046∗(0.002)
ln(Agei,t) -0.106∗(0.003) -0.108∗(0.003)
ln(Assetsbi,t−1) 0.037∗(0.002) 0.036(0.002)
ln(GOMbi,t−1) 0.006∗(0.001) 0.007∗(0.001)
al, ar 0.448, 0.425 0.431, 0.395 0.430, 0.395
Number of observations 20911 18834 18834
a ALAD estimates, standard errors in parenthesis.
b Assets is proxied with Net Tangible Assets. Gross Operating Margin(GOM) has been transformed to
avoid negative numbers.
* Significantly different from zero at 1% level.
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Figure 6: Growth rates distributions and financial constraints. Pooled data over 2000-2003.
in other studies on different data). This means that, in these two classes, the standard deviation of
growth rates among largest firms (say, those firms with st−1 ≃ 10), is approximately three times
smaller than the standard deviation among small firms (say, those firms with st−1 ≃ 4). Instead,
within HFC firms the estimated γ is about −0.16, implying a smaller reduction in growth dispersion
when moving from small to big firms, as compared to the other two classes (growth dispersion among
larger firms is only about twice smaller than among smaller firms). This is once again in accordance
with the intuition that FCs create a threshold effect, reducing the span of growth opportunities that
constrained firms can access. According to the aforementioned “portfolio theory” interpretation, the
implication is that the diversification advantage of bigger firms is considerably reduced by the effect
of FCs.
Finally, the estimates of al and ar suggest a relatively symmetric distribution of residuals. How-
ever, the ALAD estimation assumes an exact Laplace shape (i.e., bl=br=1). In order to provide a
more general assessment of the possible presence of asymmetry it is worthwhile investigating the
structure of the residuals, also with respect to different age classes. This is done in Figure 6 where we
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show kernel estimates of the empirical distributions of the residuals for young-NFC firms (top-left),
young-HFC firms (top-right), old-NFC firms (bottom-left), and old-HFC firms (bottom-right).18 The
estimates of the AEP coefficients bl, br, al, ar are reported in each panel, and differences in tail be-
havior are quantified by an AEP fit (solid line). A comparison across the estimates confirms the
tent-shape approximation. However, the age-class disaggregation shows that FCs produce apparent
differences in the shape of the shocks distributions. The very presence of such a sizeable effect is an
interesting finding per se. Recall that in fact location-shift and variance-shift effects due to FCs are
already captured in the regression through c and σ, respectively. Thus, what remains in the residuals
is only the result of asymmetric tail effects induced by FCs. Let us first focus on young firms (com-
pare the two top panels in Figure 6). If we move from NFC to HFC firms, we observe a clear-cut
slimming down of the right tail: there is a leftward shift in probability mass from the right tail to
the central part of the distribution (br increases from about 0.96 for NFC firms, and to almost 1.40
for the HFC class). Correspondingly, the right width parameter ar also shows a clear-cut increase
(from about 0.25 to about 0.62). In contrast, the left tails of the two distributions do not display
any significant difference (both al and bl are quite similar across NFC and HFC firms). The picture
changes completely when we consider old firms (see the bottom panels). In this case the differences
between NCF and HFC firms are stronger in the left tail. HFC firms have a fatter left tail, suggesting
that FCs produce a shift in probability mass towards the left tail: bl decreases from 0.75 to almost
0.58.19 Overall, these findings are in line with the existence of two types of FC effects described
in Section 4, and also suggest that such effects operate differently on different age classes. The
“pinioning the wings” effect of FCs mainly affects young firms, while older firms are those mostly
affected by the “loss reinforcing” effect of FCs.
18The distributions of MFC firms are not presented here to keep the figures more readable. The results (available
upon request), substantially mimicking the findings obtained for NFC firms, do not affect the main conclusions of our
reasoning.
19There is also an effect on the right side of the supports, qualitatively similar to that noted across young firms, and
resulting in a fatter right tail for NFC firms. For old firms, however, the effect is very mild.
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6 Robustness checks
Our baseline framework in equation (5) clearly leaves out important factors that are likely to play
a role in size-growth dynamics. In this respect, we have seen that age can be a major candidate,
exerting interesting effects on the distributional properties of residuals. Of course, there could also
be others. In this section we explore the robustness of the FC effects collected so far, by enlarging
the set of explanatory variables considered.
The relatively short time dimension of the data does not allow to perform reliable panel estimates,
which would help to control for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity. However, we can extend
the set of regressors to control for the potentially relevant factors which we can observe. Firstly, the
inclusion of firm age is mandatory, given the high correlation of age with size, and the significant
effects that age has on the distributional properties of both size and growth. Secondly, there are two
dimensions that need to be controlled for, namely availability of internally generated resources and
availability of collateral. These are crucial factors, since they interact with external FCs in determin-
ing the overall amount of financial resources available to a firm. The rationale behind the inclusion
of a proxy for collateral is that, as predicted by theory and confirmed by evidence (Angelini and
Generale, 2008), the availability of hard capital can ease the access to external financing. We mea-
sure the availability of collateral using the stock of Net Tangible Assets (labeled ASSETS). Further,
we proxy internal resources with the logarithm of Gross Operating Margin (GOM, equivalent to the
EBIDTA), thus yielding a measure of the profit margin generated by the operational activities of a
firm.20 Given the relatively high frequency of negative GOM in the sample (about 30%), negative
GOM values were transformed to 1 before taking logs. In fact, for the purposes of our analysis,
negative and null operating revenues can be considered equivalent, as in both cases there is a need
for the firm to completely rely on external resources in financing the operations.21
We run a preliminary Granger causality test between firm growth rates and FC. We estimate two
regression models. In the first model we use dummy variables distinguishing whether firms belong
20The use of GOM implies, by definition, that we do not consider the cash flow generated by non operating earnings
and losses. These should not be very relevant, however, since we are working with manufacturing firms. Moreover, due
to the limited data availability, we cannot consider the cash flows absorbed by taxes. Assuming, as a first approximation,
a constant tax rate, this would amount to a constant shift in the value of our regressor.
21As done for size, both GOM and ASSETS were deflated with appropriate sectoral price indexes, at the 3-digit level
of industry disaggregation.
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to HFC class or not. In the second model we directly use the risk-rating values as reported in the
database. Both models are augmented by the controls discussed above (age, GOM and ASSET, plus
lagged size). In both specifications, pooling over all the sample, we find that while past FC status
Granger-causes growth, past growth does not Granger-causes FC status. This result confirms our
choice to use lagged values of ratings as proxy for FC to growth.
Then, we move to our main robustness analysis, by adding the controls to our baseline specifica-
tion. We first perform Maximum Likelihood ALAD estimates of the following extended model
st − st−1 = cF C + λF C st−1 + β1F C ln(aget) + β2F C ln(GOMt−1)+
β3F C ln(ASSETSt−1) + exp(γF C st−1)ǫtF C (6)
where both GOM and ASSETS enter with a 1-period lag, at least partially accounting for simul-
taneity issues concerning these variables, and we again model heteroskedasticity via an exponential
correction.22 Results are reported in Table 2 under the heading “Model 2A”. The most notable change
induced by the inclusion of controls is that deviations from the Gibrat’s benchmark of λ = 0 are now
observed in all the FC classes. As frequently reported in studies exploring augmented Gibrat’s re-
gression, additional regressors absorb part of the size coefficient. However, the estimates of λ across
the FC classes reproduce the pattern previously obtained from our baseline model: the autoregressive
coefficient has a much lower value for the HFC class, thus confirming that the negative impact of
size on growth rates is stronger for financially constrained firms. Estimates of the heteroskedasticity
parameter γ are basically unaffected by the addition of further regressors and confirm the patterns
emerging from the simplest specification.
In general, the effects exerted by the added covariates present interesting cross-class differences.
Age displays a negative and significant coefficient in all classes, in agreement with the expectation
that on average older firms grow less than younger firms. The magnitude increases with the strength
of FCs, however, thus revealing that the detrimental effect of age is stronger among HFC firms.
It should also be noted that age is the regressor with the strongest effect (highest coefficient in
absolute value). Next, concerning the role of ASSETS, we find a positive and significant effect,
22Concerning the use of a GMM-SYS estimator, standard Sargan/Hansen tests confirm that the time span of the
database is too short to identify a valid set of instruments among past levels and past differences of the covariates.
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stronger for HFC firms: the availability of hard capital as collateral becomes more beneficial for
growth when FC are stronger. Similarly, the availability of internal resources has beneficial effects
on growth only when some degree of FCs is present, while internal resources do not seem to be
crucial for unconstrained firms (GOM is not significant for NFC, positive and significant for MFC
and HFC). However, even when significant, the magnitudes of GOM coefficients are negligible in
practical terms, suggesting that internal resources play (if any) a second order role compared to other
regressors.
A further check that we perform concerns the possible role of sector-specific dynamics. It is
well known that a firm’s dependence on external financing varies across industrial sectors (Rajan
and Zingales, 1998), so that it is likely that firms operating in different industries would display,
on average, a different degree of exposure to FC problems. There is also evidence (Hall, 2002)
that such sectoral differences in modes of financing, and thus differential exposure to FCs, are very
likely to vary depending on the sources and procedures of innovation activity of firms. In order to
control for these industry-wide factors, we re-estimate equation (6) adding dummy variables which
corresponds to the classical Pavitt taxonomy of sectoral patterns of innovation (Pavitt, 1984). The
results (cfr. Model 2B in Table 2) are clearly in line with previous estimates: all the coefficients
remain unchanged in practical terms.23
Finally, we also investigate whether the distributional properties of growth shocks are affected
by the inclusion of the new regressors. To this purpose we perform AEP estimates of the empirical
distribution of residuals of Model 2B, by FC classes and separately for young and old firms. Note that
location-shift effects due to age are captured by the age coefficient in the regression, and also recall
that (as shown in Section 5) age does not have any residual effect on the variance of growth rates,
once controlling for size. Therefore, distributional differences in the residuals of Model 2B across
age classes point toward additional effects of age in the tails. The estimates of AEP parameters,
reported in Table 3, are not significantly different from those obtained with the simplest model
23We also explored a further specification considering 2-period lags of size, ASSETS and GOM. This allows for a
check of varying effects over time, and provides a further control for possible endogeneity of covariates at t − 1. The
estimates of λ retain their signs and magnitudes, again displaying negligible values for NFC firms and then increasingly
negative as FCs become stronger. Second lag coefficients of GOM and ASSETS absorb part of the first lag effects of
these variables. The most noticeable difference compared to the estimates presented in Table 2 is a significant reduction
in the age coefficient, whose magnitude becomes comparable with that of the other regressors, and also comparable
across FC classes. The results are available upon request.
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Table 3: Growth Rates Distributions – Robustness checks
AEP Parameters
bl br al ar
YOUNG (age < 5)
NFC 0.729(0.0143) 0.975(0.0199) 0.188(0.0028) 0.244(0.0034)
HFC 0.713(0.0185) 1.436(0.0405) 0.374(0.0076) 0.602(0.0104)
OLD (age > 30)
NFC 0.751(0.0155) 0.823(0.0189) 0.159(0.0025) 0.134(0.0022)
HFC 0.717(0.0465) 0.988(0.0813) 0.384(0.0197) 0.314(0.0177)
a AEP fit of residuals from Equation (6), Pavitt class dummies also included. Standard errors in
parenthesis.
specification (apart from a small increase in the bl parameter for HFC firms).
Overall, our main conclusions remain the same even with the inclusion of other relevant deter-
minants of size-growth dynamics, such firm age and the availability of internal financial resources
or collateral, and remain unchanged when we also control for differences in sectoral patterns of
innovation.
7 Conclusion
CeBi credit ratings represent a good measure of a firm’s access to external resources. They summa-
rize several dimensions of a firm’s financial conditions and allow to measure the different degree of
credit problems, thus improving upon the rather strict binary distinction between constrained ver-
sus non-constrained firms often adopted in the literature. Moreover, they are heavily relied upon by
banks and investors in granting and pricing credit lines, thus representing an important benchmark or
a key ingredient in lending decisions. Using CeBi ratings to build a proxy for financial constraints,
we extended the typical autoregressive linear model of size-growth dynamics by including a para-
metric description of heteroskedasticity and by providing a more flexible and robust characterization
of growth shocks. Our results shows that the effects of FC on firm growth are sizeable and operate
through several channels. Firstly, FCs magnify the negative effect of size on expected growth rates:
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the lower average growth rate that typically characterizes large versus small firms becomes even
lower when FCs are presents. This is consistent with the age profile of the firm size distribution of
financially constrained and non-constrained firms. For older firms, the FSD of non constrained firms
possesses a Gaussian shape, while the FSD of financially constrained firms is more peaked. This
is the typical signature of the sub-diffusive nature of the growth process associated with a negative
autoregressive coefficient. Since our measure of FCs varies over time, the fact that we identify sig-
nificant differences in the size distribution of different FC classes suggests a relatively high degree of
persistence across the different groups. This is an interesting aspect of the FC phenomenon, which
we cannot however test directly, given the relatively short temporal span of our data.
A further effect of FCs is on the relationship between firm size and variance of growth rates.
Larger firms are well known to generally display a lower variability in their growth rates. This
observation has been related to a portfolio effect: larger firms tend to be more diversified, and thus,
to the extent that the different activities are weakly related, diversification produces a lower volatility
in aggregate growth rates. FCs seem to reduce the ability of larger firms to exploit their diversified
structure. Indeed for more severely constrained firms, the negative relationship between growth rates
variability and size is weaker than for unconstrained firms.
Furthermore, once the autoregressive structure and the heteroskedasticity effects are controlled
for, our model reveals that FCs have an additional, asymmetric effect on the tails of the growth
rates distribution. We are able to identify a loss reinforcing effect: firms who are already witnessing
a reduction in sales, see their performance worsened in the presence of FCs. This is plausibly
the results of activity dismissal and divestment. At the same time, however, firms experiencing
positive growth rates, if hit by FCs, are likely to see their growth potentials depressed. In fact, credit
problems generate a ”pinioning the wings” effect which prevents constrained firms from fully seizing
the available growth opportunities. The economic consequences of these two effects are different.
While the loss reinforcing effect can be seen as a natural market selection mechanism, generating,
at least in the long run, a more efficient reallocation of productive resources, the pinioning effect
plausibly translates into a net loss of growth opportunities. The fact that the pinioning mechanism
is more common across younger firms is not unexpected and is compatible with the presence of
frictions and inefficiencies in the capital market.
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According to our credit-rating based measure of financial constraints, the problem of credit ra-
tioning is widespread and affects a much larger population of Italian manufacturing firms than what
suggested by previous predictions obtained from survey-based measures (Angelini and Generale,
2008, see). This difference can be explained either by a self-selection bias in the population of re-
spondents which is known to often affect survey data, or by admitting the possibility that not all
firms with poor credit ratings were actually to be considered financially rationed. However, this
consideration does not weaken the conclusions of our analysis. On the contrary, the fact that we still
observe significant differences among the FC classes, notwithstanding the possible use of a some-
what loose proxy of FCs, represents a strong proof of the existence of a real economic effect. The
adoption of a more stringent measure of FC would change the results in the direction of an even
cleaner identification of this effect.
Finally, it is worth asking if our measure of FCs can also be considered as a proxy for the overall
availability of financial resources, capturing at the same time difficulties in accessing external finance
as well as shortage of internal financial resources. We tend to believe it can, as indeed internal
resources constitute the best guarantee to potential lenders that firms are able to sustain the due
interest payments. As a result, firms with sound financial conditions and reasonable levels of profits
are almost automatically assigned high ratings, while the shortage of internal resources, whether
generated by poor operating performances or by unsound financial conditions, is very likely to be
punished with bad ratings. In any case, our conclusions are still valid even when we explicitly add
a control for the availability of internal resources. Indeed, while profit margins are associated with
produce a positive shift in the average growth rate, both the pinioning and loss reinforcing effects
of FCs remain unchanged, as does the reduced ability of larger and financially constrained firms to
exploit diversification economies.
In summary, we have shown that FC problems do have relevant effects on the operating activities
of firms. In order to identify these effects, however, one has to do more work than just relying upon
standard linear regression framework. FC effects are indeed manifold and impact on several aspects
of firm growth dynamics, ranging well beyond a shift in the expected growth rates.
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8 APPENDIX
8.1 Cleaning anomalous observations
We removed a few anomalous data from our sample. Cleaning was performed using Total Sales as a
reference variable. For each firm, a missing value was inserted, in the place of the original value of
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Total Sales, when the latter lay outside the interval
[Median(TSi)/10;Median(TSi) ∗ 10] , (7)
where the median is computed over the years for which data are available for firm i. Table 4 shows
yearly descriptive statistics computed before and after the cleaning. It is apparent that the procedure
does not introduce any relevant change to the data.
Table 4: TOTAL SALESa DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
BEFORE CLEANING FILTER
Year Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Obs.
2000 5700.82 1014.00 48730.09 57.89 4894.16 1.00 5634948.00 109689.00
2001 5972.90 1011.00 73679.67 141.82 29897.12 1.00 17547260.00 113405.00
2002 5804.92 973.00 67304.35 146.66 32359.62 1.00 16484840.00 116084.00
2003 5639.77 953.00 64724.22 147.42 32317.38 1.00 15803760.00 115777.00
AFTER CLEANING FILTER
Year Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Obs.
2000 5754.55 1046.00 47700.57 58.99 5192.76 1.00 5634948.00 107250.00
2001 5878.64 1025.00 69435.93 159.48 37224.24 1.00 17547260.00 112036.00
2002 5806.96 992.00 67093.95 150.02 33371.72 1.00 16484840.00 113849.00
2003 5688.46 981.00 65417.79 147.67 32063.94 1.00 15803760.00 111810.00
a Nominal Total Sales in thousands of Euro.
8.2 Asymptotic behavior of the autoregressive process
Start from the model of firm size evolution as described in (3), where the shocks ǫ are independent
and identically distributed according to a probability density f with mean c. Let s0 be the initial
size of the firm. By dropping the heteroskedastic term (i.e. setting σ(st) = 1) for simplicity, and by
recursive application of (3), the size after T time steps, sT , can be written as the weighted sum of T
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independent random variables
sT = (1 + λ)
T s0 +
T−1∑
τ=0
(1 + λ)τ ǫt−τ .
Consider the cumulant generating function of the size at time T, g˜sT , defined as the logarithm of the
Fourier transform of the unconditional distribution
g˜sT (k) = log E[e
iksT ] .
Due to the i.i.d. nature of the shocks it is immediate to see that
g˜sT (k) = g˜s0((1 + λ)
Tk) +
T−1∑
τ=0
f˜((1 + λ)τk)
where g˜s0 and f˜ are the cumulants of the initial size distribution and of the shocks distribution,
respectively. As a consequence, if the initial size distribution and the shocks distribution possess the
cumulant of order n, Cn, then the size distribution at time T also possesses it, and thus, with obvious
notation
CnsT =
dm
dkm
g˜sT (k)
∣∣∣∣
k=0
= (1 + λ)mT Cns0 +
(1 + λ)mT − 1
(1 + λ)m − 1
Cnǫ .
Equation (4) in Section 4 directly follows by noting that the mean and the variance are the first and
second cumulants, respectively: M = C1 and V = C2.
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